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 Abstract 
 
 The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers (CEOs) is a non-trivial phenomenon 
of the composition of boards of directors and of corporate governance: among large companies in 
1991, about one company in seven is part of a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sits 
on a second company's board and the second company's CEO sits on the first company's board.  We 
are aware of no previous efforts to explain these reciprocal relationships.  We hypothesize that 
reciprocal CEO interlocks are (a) more likely when a board has more outside directorships, (b) less 
likely when a CEO has more of his total annual compensation paid in the form of stock options, (c) 
less likely when a company's board is more active and holds more meetings, (d) less likely when a 
CEO has a larger ownership share of his company, and (e) more likely when there are more CEOs 
from other companies as outside directors on a CEO's board.  Using a sizable sample of large 
companies in 1991, we employ simple probit and step probit models to test these hypotheses, with 
the use of control variables that encompass other company, board, and CEO characteristics.  These 
multivariate analyses support our first three conjectures but do not support the remaining two. 
 Since there is considerable academic and policy debate concerning board composition and 
the effectiveness of interlocking directorships in general, investigations focusing on reciprocal CEO 
interlocks, which link the highest ranked executives of two different firms, represent a significant 
contribution to the knowledge base in this field. 
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1. Introduction 
 The practice of interlocking directorates1 has been a subject of debate among 
corporate governance activists and academics for many decades.  Although Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act of 1914 prohibited interlocking directorates between competing firms, it did not 
prohibit board interlocks in general.  The proxy disclosure rules promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1992 require firms to disclose director 
interlocks where matters of executive compensation are concerned.  The National 
Association of Corporate Directors Blue Ribbon Commission guidelines (NACD, 1996) 
advocate the avoidance of interlocking directorates.  In practice, interlocking directorates 
occur regularly across industries and have often been favorably praised, since they mobilize 
a scarce resource: the expertise of senior managers and directors of large corporations.  
 Recent studies in financial economics have devoted attention to the possible 
implications of interlocking directorates.2  However, none have considered the factors that 
determine why firms might reciprocally share the services of their most senior executives -- 
specifically, their chief executive officers (CEOs) -- through mutual board membership.  We 
note that these types of reciprocal interlocks are a non-trivial phenomenon: among large 
companies in 1991, one firm in seven is involved in this type of reciprocal interlock.  Since 
                                                           
     1 An interlocking directorate is defined as the phenomenon whereby a person is on the 
board of directors of two or more corporations, thereby providing a link or interlock 
between them. 
     2 See, for example, Hallock (1997) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999). 
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there is considerable academic and policy interest in board composition and interlocking 
directorates generally, the development of new information about reciprocal CEO 
interlocks, which involve the corporate executives with the greatest authority and marginal 
productivity (Smith and Watts, 1992) as well as the potential for substantially influencing 
board activities, represents a significant expansion of the knowledge base in this field. 
 Our objective is to examine the factors that explain this reciprocal interlocking of 
CEOs.  A reciprocal CEO interlock occurs when the CEO of firm i serves as a director of 
firm j, and the CEO of firm j serves as a director of firm i.  Our empirical results indicate 
that the reciprocal interlocking of CEOs is more likely to occur in firms where directors 
have larger numbers of outside directorships.  Our findings also indicate that the probability 
of a reciprocal CEO interlock decreases for CEOs who derive high fractions of their total 
compensation from stock options.  In addition, we report a negative association between the 
incidence of reciprocal CEO interlocks and the number of meetings that the board holds 
during the fiscal year.  Two other hypotheses that we develop -- that reciprocal CEO 
interlocks should be less likely where a CEO has larger ownership position in his company 
and should be more likely where the number of CEOs from other companies sit on the 
CEO's board of directors -- are not supported in our multivariate analysis (although we do 
find support for them in our univariate analysis). 
 These results contribute to the corporate governance literature by identifying some 
of the determinants of a significant category of board interlocks -- specifically, those 
involving reciprocal CEO interlocks -- and they advance the general understanding of the 
composition of corporate boards and the outside-the-firm decisions of CEOs.  In addition, 
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our results shed some direct and indirect light on the implications of reciprocal CEO 
interlocks for shareholder wealth. 
 Our paper proceeds as follows:  The next section reviews the prior academic 
literature studying interlocking directorates.  Our theories and hypotheses are contained in 
Section 3.  Section 4 describes the sample selection and the data used in this study.  
Empirical analyses and results are the subject of Section 5.  In Section 6 we provide a 
summary and conclusions of this study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 A simple board interlock occurs when a person serves on the board of more than one 
company.  Mutually interlocking relationships are defined to occur when at least two 
directors together serve on the boards of two different corporations.3  When a sense of 
direction to this mutuality can be identified -- as when, for example, the CEO of one 
company is serving on the board of a second company, while the CEO of that second 
company is also serving on the board of the first -- we define this as reciprocal interlocking.  
 One of the first academic studies in the United States to consider simple board 
interlocks is Dooley (1969).  Dooley finds that less solvent firms were likely to be 
interlocked with banks.  Later studies also report that firms with high debt-to-equity ratios 
(Pfeffer, 1972) or organizations with an increased demand for capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988) have a higher tendency to interlock their boards.  Two possible interpretations can be 
drawn from these studies.  On the one hand, it is possible that financially distressed firms 
seek to add bank officers to their boards in order to receive favorable consideration from the 
                                                           
     3 This definition is used in Fich (2000a). 
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lending institution.  On the other hand, banks could demand to have one or more of its 
officers as a board director in order to monitor the firm's investment prospects more closely.  
However, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find that banks tend to avoid having an officer sit on 
the board of a company to which they have lent and that may become financially troubled, 
because of concerns about subsequent claims of conflict of interest.  Also, Kracaw and 
Zenner (1998) examine the stock price reactions to bank loan announcements when the bank 
and the borrower have interlocking directorates.  They find significant negative returns to 
bank loan announcement when a bank officer serves on the borrower's board.  They note 
that the negative reactions are less prevalent among larger firms.  
 Behaviorists argue that companies use board-interlocks as a mechanism to improve 
contracting relationships (Schoorman, Bazerman, and Atkin, 1981).  Some papers in this 
literature focus on the reconstitution of broken or disrupted interlock ties between firms 
(e.g., Palmer, 1983) or in the assessment of the importance of interlocks in reducing the 
information uncertainties created by resource dependencies between firms (Pettigrew, 
1992).  
 In addition to the organizational behavior literature, a number of recent studies in 
financial economics are concerned with interlocking relationships between firms.  For 
instance, a study of Australian firms reveals that company and individual director interlocks 
as well as board size have decreased since the mid eighties (Roy, Fox, and Hamilton, 1994).  
Booth and Deli (1996) report that when employees (not necessarily CEOs) of two different 
companies sit on each other's boards, the CEOs hold more outside directorships.  Hallock 
(1997) finds that CEOs serving in any employee-interlocked firms earn higher salaries than 
they otherwise would.  Like Hallock (1997), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) do not 
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find any association between director interlock and total compensation.  In contrast, Fich 
(2000a) reports positive associations between the number of interlocking directorships and 
the compensation that CEOs derive from executive stock options.  
 Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) study director interlocks between bidder and 
target firms.  Their results suggest that the presence of director interlocks reduces the gains 
to target shareholders and decreases the likelihood that a target firm receives multiple bids.  
They indicate that interlocking directorships can affect target shareholder gains in at least 
two ways.  First, interlocked directors have fiduciary obligations to the shareholders of both 
the target and the bidder, thus creating a conflict of interest.  Second, such directors can 
ameliorate the information asymmetry between the interlocked bidder and target (but not 
necessarily with respect to other potential bidders) and may therefore dissuade other likely 
bidders from bidding.  Fich (2000a) reports a negative association between the number of 
interlocking directorships and the probability of CEO turnover.  These results suggest that 
interlocking directorates can create abuse if they endanger the independence of interlocked 
firms, decrease competition in the market for corporate control, exacerbate agency 
problems, or violate directors' fiduciary obligations as the agents of stockholders. 
 Results presented by Fich (2000b) indicate the absence of a relation between the 
number of CEO interlocks, or any employee interlock, and firm value as measured by 
Tobin's Q.  These results suggest that interlocking relationships do not enhance the value of 
the firm and cast doubt on the extent to which firms use these relationships to improve their 
strategic objectives. 
 Recent studies provide some insight for understanding the reasons why CEOs accept 
outside directorship positions.  Vancil (1987) maintains that as CEOs delegate authority to 
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their likely successors, they free themselves to hold director positions with other firms.  
Booth and Deli (1996) argue that outside directorships do not represent unchecked 
perquisite consumption by CEOs.  They find that CEOs of firms with growth opportunities 
hold fewer outside directorships and that CEOs are likely to hold more outside director 
positions as they transfer decision rights to their eventual substitute.  Their research does not 
provide potential reasons for firms to interlock their CEOs. 
 All of these studies suggest that interlocking relationships between the boards of 
different companies warrant further scrutiny. In this study we attempt to explain why CEOs 
of different firms reciprocally interlock their boards by serving as directors on each other's 
boards. 
  
3. Theories and Hypotheses4 
3.1 Board Reputation 
 Fama (1980) views the board of directors as an important governance mechanism, 
arguing that the directors' concerns for their own reputation in the director labor market 
causes them to be effective monitors.5  Mace (1986) suggests that directorships can be a 
source of prestige and business contacts, which may induce board members to seek outside 
directorships. However, if there is an efficiently functioning market for managerial human 
                                                           
     4 As will be clear in the discussions of the data and results in Sections 4 and 5, in addition 
to the primary hypotheses advanced in the text below, we also include in our empirical 
testing a number of control variables, such as the size of the firm, the size of the board, 
characteristics of the CEO, etc. 
     5 Reputation considerations can be a double-edged sword, since directors could also 
develop a reputation for being "soft" in their monitoring of management, enticing some 
executives to seek them as directors.  Other mechanisms, such as equity-based pay, must be 
put in place to assure that directors will fulfill their fiduciary responsibility and act in the 
best interests of the stockholders. 
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capital, only the most experienced and effective directors would be invited to serve as 
directors on other boards. 
 Directors who have reputations as good monitors might be sought for service on 
many boards, and some studies have therefore used the number of additional board 
appointments as a measure of a director's quality.6  For these reasons boards whose 
members have larger numbers of other director obligations are likely to be perceived as 
being of high quality.  This reputation for quality may extend to the firm's CEO, who has 
succeeded in assembling and presiding over the high-quality board.  If this is the case, then 
CEOs from companies with highly reputable boards would be sought by other companies to 
serve as directors on their boards.  Further, the CEOs of these other firms might also want to 
serve as directors on the highly reputable boards, either for personal reasons (e.g., to build 
personal prestige, develop contacts, etc.) or to enhance their productivity as CEOs of their 
"home" company.  In line with previous studies, we use the total number of outside board 
obligations (directorships) of a given board as a proxy for the board's (or its directors') 
reputation. We utilize this variable to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The probability of reciprocal CEO interlocks increases in firms with highly reputable 
boards. 
 
3.2 CEO Compensation 
 Berle and Means (1932) suggest that managerial ownership in large companies is 
too small to make managers interested in profit maximization.  Jackson and Lazear (1991) 
and others have reported the benefits of deferred compensation, usually in the form of stock 
                                                           
     6 Evidence presented by Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Shivdasani (1993), and others 
support the view that the number of directorships may serve as an indicator of director 
reputation. 
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options for retaining executives.  They argue that stock-based compensation aids in the 
retention of executives because its payoffs are often deferred for a number of years into the 
future, requiring managers to stay with the firm and to make decisions that enhance the 
firm's long-run value in order to be able to receive payment.  Hagerty, Ofer, and Siegel 
(1991) show that stock options can be especially effective at inducing far-sighted managerial 
behavior.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that since the job performed by top 
management has a greater impact on overall firm performance, top management potential 
responsiveness to incentives is greater.  Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) assert that 
managers respond to the absence of incentives by taking "uneconomic actions." 
 All of these studies suggest that compensation contracts that include appropriate 
levels of deferred performance contingent pay should be effective in retaining highly 
qualified managers with the firms.  The most utilized form of performance-contingent 
compensation for senior management is the executive stock option.  Indeed, Yermack 
(1995) indicates that the lion's share of the CEO's compensation package results largely 
from variability in stock option awards.  And Mehran and Yermack (1997) find an inverse 
and significant association between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of 
stock option compensation that the CEO receives relative to his other compensation (i.e., 
basic salary and bonus). 
 Two characteristics of executive stock options are (1) that they augment base 
salaries with a call option and (2) executives are contractually restricted from exercising 
stock options for a specific period of time after the grant. 
 The first characteristic serves a dual purpose.  On the one hand, the call option 
implies that managers' total compensation pattern is aligned with the compensation of 
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shareholders.  On the other hand, in order to augment the value of the call option managers 
should stay focused with their work on the firm and are less likely to look elsewhere for 
outside directorships.  The second stock option characteristic also creates an important 
mechanism to keep valuable managers with the firm, since executives will have to wait 
before they are contractually allowed to exercise the options and cash in.  Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) report the lack of strong pay-for-performance incentives for CEOs.  If CEOs 
are not motivated enough to increase their firm performance they may seek additional 
compensation opportunities elsewhere. 
 This discussion suggests that CEOs who receive a significant amount of their pay 
from firm performance-contingent instruments would be less likely to seek or accept 
reciprocal interlocks with the chief executives of other firms.  These conjectures lead to: 
H2: The probability of reciprocal CEO interlocks decreases in companies where chief 
executives derive large fractions of their total remuneration from stock options. 
 The key explanatory variable that we use to test H2 is the fraction of the CEO's total 
compensation that comes from executive stock options.  The numerator has the value of the 
new stock options the CEO receives when granted during the year; the denominator 
encompasses the total compensation of the CEO, including his regular salary, bonus, fringe 
benefits, and the value of the options. 
 The value of new stock options when granted during 1991 is computed assuming 
that the prevailing stock price equals the option's exercise price7 and is calculated using the 
Black-Scholes (1973) methodology, adjusted for dividend payouts (Merton,1973), which is: 
                                                           
     7 In the calculations it is assumed that the underlying stock price at the time of the award 
equals the exercise price of options, because almost all firms set the exercise price equal to 
the current stock price (see, e.g., Smith and Zimmerman, 1976; Yermack, 1995).  The 
average yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds during the last month of the year is used for 
the interest rate.  Finally, a maturity time of 10 years for the options is assumed, since this is 
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 optval = N[Pe-dTΦ(Z) - Ee-rTΦ(Z - σ(T)1/2)] 
 Z = [ln(P/E) + T(r - d + σ2/2)]/[σ(T)1/2] 
where 
 N  = Number of shares represented by the stock option award 
 P  = Price of underlying stock at the end of the year 
 E  = Average exercise price of the stock options granted 
 d  = log (1 + dividend rate/price at the end of the year) 
 r  = log (1 + year-end interest rate) 
 Φ  = Cumulative probability function (normal distribution) 
 σ  = Expected stock return volatility over life of option 
 T  = time to expiration 
 
3.3 Board Activity 
 The board of directors of a major corporation should meet regularly in order to 
monitor and discuss the various activities of the firm.  Vafeas (1999) finds that increasing 
board meeting activity sends a negative signal to the market.  He finds that firms whose 
boards meet more frequently are less valued by the market.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
maintain that the most widely shared problem that directors confront is a lack of time to 
carry out their duties. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) argue that the benefits of outside 
directorship levels could be non-linear, declining for the highest directorship levels as busy 
directors might have less available time to attend other board meetings and properly monitor 
the activities of other firms.  
 These studies suggest that increasing board activity may dissuade CEOs from 
seeking reciprocal interlocks with their counterparts whose companies have active boards.  
This lack of interest might arise because increasing board activity could be a signal of bad 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the duration for the majority of CEO awards and the limit imposed by the IRS for options to 
receive favorable tax treatment (see Matsunaga, 1995). 
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news for the firm (Jensen, 1993) or simply because the directors are expected to monitor 
aggressively the activities of the firm.  In addition, if a CEO's "home" board is more active 
(as evidenced by more meetings), that CEO may have less free time and therefore be less 
inclined (e.g., because of less free time) to seek directorships on other boards.  These 
arguments lead us to: 
H3: The probability of reciprocal CEO interlocks decreases in firms with greater board 
meeting activity. 
 Board meeting activity is measured as the actual number of board meetings per year 
that firms report in their proxy statements.  This variable includes all meetings of the board 
of directors during the fiscal year, including regular and special meetings, but not telephone 
meetings or action by written consent. 
 
3.4 Equity Ownership 
 Academics have long noted that low levels of managerial stock ownership 
encourage agency problems.  As argued by Berle and Means (1932) as well as by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), when managers own little equity ownership and stockholders are 
diffuse, managers may deviate from stockholder value maximization and instead embrace 
self-gain policies.  Significant amounts of equity ownership have long been identified as an 
effective mechanism to align the incentives of managers with those of their shareholders and 
thus entice managers to embrace value-maximizing projects for the benefit of shareholders.  
To the extent that a CEO's outside directorships represent time and effort that he undertakes 
because of personal gain and that divert him from his primary responsibilities,8 we are led to 
the following hypothesis: 
                                                           
     8 Brown and Bacon (1974) suggest a number of reasons why a CEO might join other 
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H4: The probability of a reciprocal CEO interlock decreases with larger amounts of equity 
ownership by the CEO. 
 
 To test this hypothesis we use the CEO's fractional ownership of the firm as an 
independent variable in our econometric analysis.  The numerator of this variable is the 
number of shares owned by the CEO and or his/her immediate family.  The denominator is 
the total number of the firm's shares that are outstanding. 
 
3.5 Number of CEOs on a Company's Board 
 The presence of another company's CEO on a company's board already provides the 
first link of a potential reciprocal CEO interlock.  Further, that CEO's presence may 
encourage reciprocation, for a number of potential reasons:  First, the reciprocal interlock 
may strengthen any strategic links between the two companies.  Second, the two individuals 
may recognize the opportunities for mutual support on each other's board (i.e., mutual "back 
scratching").  Third, the two may simply come to appreciate and be comfortable with each 
other.  These arguments lead us to the following: 
 H5: The likelihood of the formation of a reciprocal CEO interlock increases with a 
larger number of CEOs of other companies who serve on a company's board of directors.  
 
 We test this hypothesis by including in our models the number of CEOs of other 
companies that serve as outside directors on a company's board as an explanatory variable. 
 In addition to our five primary hypotheses, we also implicitly test a number of lesser 
hypotheses by including control variables in our regressions, which involve variables 
encompassing the firm's characteristics (e.g., the firm's total assets, Tobin's Q, whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
boards.  Booth and Deli (1996) directly test hypotheses concerning the numbers of outside 
directorships held by CEOs. 
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firm is a bank), the board's characteristics (e.g., size of board, board compensation), and the 
CEO's characteristics (e.g., the CEO's age and tenure). 
 
4. Sample Selection, Data Description, and Summary Statistics 
 The estimations reported below rely on our examination of a data set that provides 
board composition, compensation, and other company information for firms during the 1991 
proxy season.9  The data set includes information on board and director characteristics, firm 
performance, and other company attributes for all the companies in the set. 
 To qualify for inclusion in the sample, a firm is required to rank among Forbes 
magazine's largest 500 U.S. companies in any of the categories of total assets, market 
capitalization, sales, or net income.10  For each firm, compensation data were collected and 
arranged from the corporation's SEC proxy, 10-K, and 8-K filings.  Data on board and 
ownership structure and operational and stock market performance were also collected and 
classified for all companies in the sample.  Further, for each of the firms in the sample, data 
on their board composition was gathered and organized.  Each director is assigned a 
classification according to his/her principal occupation.  Full-time employees of the 
company are designated as inside directors.  Those individuals who are closely associated 
with the firm -- for example those who are relatives of corporate officers, lawyers, 
                                                           
     9 We wish to thank David Yermack and Kevin Hallock for graciously sharing their data 
with us. 
     10 The Forbes 500 data set has been used as the source of firms for the investigation of a 
number of other corporate governance questions; see, for example, Murphy (1985), Murphy 
and Zimmerman (1993), Yermack (1995), Hallock (1997), and Vafeas (1999).  As a partial 
test for large-firm bias, we split the sample in half by size of firm, and re-ran the basic 
regressions of Section 5 using the two sub-samples of larger and smaller firms.  The same 
results emerged for the two sub-samples as is reported for our overall sample, and an F-test 
indicated the absence of a significant difference between the two sub-sample estimations. 
 14
consultants, or those who have substantial business relationships with the company -- are 
designated as "gray" directors.  Outside directors are those who do not have either inside or 
gray status. 
 The data set includes the name of the firm for which he/she serves as director, full 
name and occupation, principal employer, and whether he or she is retired.  The data cover 
9,804 director seats held by 7,519 individuals.  There are fewer individuals than seats since 
some directors are members of more than one board.  When necessary the data from annual 
reports and proxy statements were supplemented with information from the Million Dollar 
Directory, Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, the Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, the Lexis-Nexis System, and Laser 
Disclosure.  
 The final data set analyzed consists of the 610 firms for the 1991 proxy season for 
which complete data could be gathered from these sources, supplemented by operational 
data gathered from COMPUSTAT and stock market performance data obtained from the 
Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP). 
 We present some sample descriptive statistics in Table 1.  These data encompass 
CEO, board, and company attributes.  The mean board size of 13.05 in our sample is 
comparable to the board sizes of 12.62 reported by Booth and Deli (1996) for 1989-1990 
and 12.30 reported by Klein (1998) for 1992-1993 data.  The mean tenure of a CEO as CEO 
reported in our Table 1 (8.62) is similar to the CEO tenure (8.4) reported by Booth and Deli 
(1996).  And the mean number of board meetings (8.32) reported in Table 1 is comparable 
to the board meetings (7.45) reported by Vafeas (1999) for 1990-1994. 
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 Table 2 presents statistics on the incidence of reciprocal CEO interlocks in our 
sample.  Eighty-seven firms, or 14.2% of the firms in the sample, have at least one 
reciprocal CEO interlock relationship.  Of these 87 firms, most (72 firms) have only one 
reciprocal CEO interlock. 
 In Table 3 we present the simple means of the CEO, board, and company variables 
for the firms that have at least one reciprocal CEO interlock and also for those that have 
none, along with the results of t-tests on the differences in means between the two groups.  
As can be seen, the differences in sub-sample means are statistically significant (at a 10% or 
better level) for 13 variables.  With respect to our primary hypotheses discussed in Section 
3, there is a large and quite significant positive difference between the mean number of 
outside directorships held by the board members of a company with a reciprocal CEO 
interlock and by the board members of a company that has none,11 consistent with H1.  With 
respect to H2, the mean of the fraction of the CEO's total compensation that is received in 
the form of stock options is larger for the companies with reciprocally interlocked CEOs 
than for the companies without interlocked CEOs, but the difference is not significant.  With 
respect to H3, the mean of the number of board meetings is smaller for the companies with 
reciprocally linked CEOs than for the companies without interlocked CEOs, but the 
difference is not significant.  As for H4, the stock ownership in the firm of a CEO who is 
part of a reciprocal interlock is significantly smaller than is true for a CEO who is not part of 
a reciprocal interlock, which is consistent with our conjecture.  Finally, with respect to H5, 
the number of CEOs on the boards of companies with reciprocal CEO interlocks is 
                                                           
     11 The simple Pearson correlation coefficient between the presence of at least one 
reciprocal CEO interlock for a company and the board reputation variable is 0.40. 
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significantly larger than is true for companies without such interlocks, which again is 
consistent with our conjecture. 
  In addition, significant positive differences are found with respect to the means of 
the CEO's salary and bonus, the CEO's age, the CEO's tenure in the firm, the board size, the 
number of outside directors, the number of all reciprocal company interlocks, the director's 
retainer fee, and firm size.  Significant negative differences in means are found for the CEO 
as a member of the founding family and for the bank indicator.  This last result may be part 
of the effect found by Kroszner and Strahan (1999), whereby banks are reluctant to have 
interlocks with companies that may become financially troubled; or it may simply be an 
indication of the additional regulatory pressures that are placed on banks, which may leave 
bank CEOs with less free time for outside directorships. 
 Simple bivariate comparisons, of course, may not reveal the complete statistical 
story, because of the parallel and confounding influences of key variables.  Consequently, 
we now turn to our multivariate analyses. 
 
5. Multivariate Analyses and Results 
 For all of our analyses, our unit of observation is a company (in 1991) and its CEO, 
board, and company characteristics are the relevant variables. 
 
5.1 Simple Probit and Step Probit Models 
 To test our hypotheses we first construct an indicator variable that takes the value of 
zero if a company is not part of a reciprocal CEO interlock and the value of one otherwise.  
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We use this (0,1) indicator variable as the dependent variable in the estimation of the 
following probit model: 
 Probability (occurrence of reciprocal CEO interlock) = f (board reputation, fraction 
of the CEO pay coming from stock options, number of board meetings, Tobin's Q, CEO 
tenure with the firm, the number of CEO-directors on the board, the fractional equity 
ownership of the CEO in the firm, and other [control] variables). 
To account for industry effects, we include as independent variables a set of (0,1) dummy 
variables representing the primary two-digit SIC industry of each firm.12 
 The probit analysis just described simply registers the presence or absence of one or 
more reciprocal CEO interlocks on a company's board.  As indicated in Table 2, 72 
companies in our sample have a single reciprocal CEO interlock, 12 firms experience two 
reciprocal CEO interlocks, and three firms experience three reciprocal CEO interlocks.  To 
incorporate this greater completeness of information about these multiple interlocks (and 
because the number of reciprocal CEO interlocks cannot be less than zero and thus this 
variable is left-hand censored) we also estimate a step probit model that includes the actual 
count (rather than just the presence) of reciprocal CEO interlocks for each firm as the 
dependent variable.  The same explanatory variables appear in this regression as in our 
probit model. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
                                                           
     12 The aggregate group of industry dummy variables does not pass an F-test for 
significance, and their presence does not change the coefficient values or significance levels 
appreciably.  Nevertheless, for completeness, both the simple probit and the step probit 
regressions shown in Table 4 include the industry dummy variables as (unreported) 
explanatory variables. 
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 The results of our simple probit and step probit regressions are presented in Table 
4.13  As can be seen, the results of the two models -- in terms of the magnitudes of 
coefficients and levels of statistical significance -- are quite similar. 
 The most significant explanatory variable in both regressions is the reputation of the 
company's board, as proxied by the number of outside directorships held by that company's 
directors.14  It is worth noting that the board size itself is one of the control variables and is 
not significant. 
 This strong positive relationship between a firm's involvement in a CEO reciprocal 
interlock and the external involvement of its board provides strong support for our first 
hypothesis.  CEO's do seem to want to associate with "classy" boards, and a CEO who has 
succeeded in assembling a "classy" board is more desirable as a member of other companies' 
boards.15 
 Another significant variable in our analyses is the fraction of the CEO's total annual 
remuneration that comes in the form of stock options.  The larger is this fraction, the less 
likely is the CEO (and thus the company) to be involved in a reciprocal CEO interlock.  The 
absolute size of the CEO's remuneration is controlled for by the inclusion of the CEO's base 
salary and bonus as an explanatory variable; it is not significant. 
                                                           
13 Since (as Table 3 indicates) we have incomplete data for some of the companies among 
the 610 in our sample, the regressions in Table 4 involve 603 observations on the 
companies for which complete data are available. 
14 We also tried an alternative version of a board reputation variable: the average number 
of outside directorships held by the company’s board members.  The regression results 
were qualitatively the same as those reported. 
     15 A somewhat different, though consistent interpretation of our result would be that a 
company that has a corporate culture of its directors' holding outside positions would likely 
involve the CEO in this culture as well.  Core et al. (1999) question the efficiency of 
directors who serve on multiple boards.  Thus, this positive association between reciprocal 
CEO interlocks and outside board positions by the CEO's board may be an indication that 
this inefficient culture encourages an inefficient practice by the company's CEO. 
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 This negative association between the stock-option fraction of total remuneration 
and the likelihood of the CEO's involvement in a reciprocal CEO interlock is support for our 
second hypothesis.  A CEO that will be richly rewarded from a strong performance of his 
company is less likely to be seeking outside directorships, including reciprocal CEO 
interlocks. 
 A third significant variable is the annual number of board meetings.  Larger numbers 
of meetings are associated with a lower probability of a reciprocal CEO interlock.  The 
magnitude of the directors' fees is also included as an explanatory variable, but is not 
significant. 
 The inverse relationship between the numbers of meetings and the probability of a 
reciprocal CEO interlock is support for our third hypothesis.  More meetings may keep a 
CEO more involved "at home" and mean less time for outside involvements; or the time 
commitment of more meetings may deter a CEO from another company from becoming a 
director; or more meetings may be indicative of company difficulties, which another 
company's CEO may want to avoid. 
 Our fourth hypothesis -- that reciprocal CEO interlocks should be negatively 
associated with the CEO's ownership position in his firm -- is not as strongly supported by 
our multivariate analyses.  Though the signs of this variable are negative in both regressions, 
neither coefficient attains even a 10% significance level.  This result is contrary to the result 
of our univariate analysis, which showed a significantly smaller ownership position by the 
CEOs who were involved in reciprocal interlocks than was true for the CEOs without 
reciprocal interlocks. However, the CEO ownership variable is strongly and positively 
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correlated with the tenure of the CEO as CEO16 and with the CEO as founder,17 as well as 
showing lesser levels of association with the other explanatory variables.18  These other 
influences may be confounding and weakening the underlying negative relationship between 
reciprocal CEO interlocks and CEO ownership. 
 Similarly, our fifth hypothesis -- that reciprocal CEO interlocks should be positively 
associated with the number of CEOs of other firms that are on a company's board -- is not as 
strongly supported by our multivariate analyses.  Again, the signs for the variable are as 
predicted -- positive -- but the coefficients are not significant; by contrast, the univariate 
analysis showed that there were a significantly larger number of outside CEOs on the board 
of a reciprocally interlocked CEO than was true for the board of a CEO that was not 
reciprocally interlocked.  And again, correlations with other explanatory variables may be 
part of the reason why the underlying positive relationship fails to hold in the multivariate 
analyses.19 
                                                           
     16 The Pearson correlation coefficient is +0.35. 
     17 The Pearson correlation coefficient is +0.45. 
     18 When the CEO ownership variable is regressed against all of the other explanatory 
variables in a separate OLS regression, the R2 is 0.30. 
     19 The number of other companies' CEOs that are on a company's board is strongly and 
positively associated with the size of the board (r=+0.46) and with the outside directorships 
held by that company's board members (r=+0.44).  When the number of outside CEOs on a 
company's board is regressed against all of the other explanatory variables in a simple OLS 
regression, the R2 is 0.32.  The strong positive association between the number of outside 
CEOs on a company's board and the outside directorships held by that company's board 
members raises another possible explanation for the lack of significance of the CEO variable 
in the multivariate context:  CEOs from other companies may want to join a board, so as to 
be able to associate with its "classy" members; but the CEO of that company may not feel as 
strongly about reciprocating. 
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 There are a few other variables that are significant and that are worthy of discussion.  
First, the firm's Tobin's Q20 is positively associated with the probability of a reciprocal CEO 
interlock.  A larger Tobin's Q is likely to be indicative of a highly valued firm with more 
growth opportunities.  Alternatively, the higher Tobin's Q may indicate greater intangible 
assets of the senior management of the firm (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989).  For either 
reason, other CEOs may want to be associated with such a firm, and other companies may 
want this firm's CEO to add luster to their boards.21 
 Second, the CEO's tenure with the firm is positively associated with the probability 
of a reciprocal CEO interlock.  The longer that a CEO is with a company, especially as a 
senior manager, the greater will be the opportunities that he will have to meet senior 
managers (and potential or actual CEOs) of other large firms and (through natural selection) 
the more likely is he to gain a favorable reputation, for himself and for his company.  Both 
effects of longevity would encourage the formation of reciprocal CEO interlocks.22 
                                                           
     20 Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of the firm's assets divided by the replacement 
costs of the assets.  We follow Yermack (1996) in using the recursive methodology 
proposed by Perfect and Wiles (1994) for valuing debt, inventory, and fixed assets.  The 
market value of assets is computed by adding the estimated values of the components of 
total liabilities and stockholders' equity.  Recursive algorithms that take into account the 
effect of inflation, real depreciation rates, capital expenditures, and the method of inventory 
valuation used by each company are used to estimate the replacement costs of inventories 
and fixed assets.  Other assets are assumed to have replacement costs equal to book values 
(Yermack 1996). 
     21 Booth and Deli (1996) find a negative relationship between the number of outside 
directorships held by a CEO and the market-to-book ratio of the company's assets.  They 
interpret their result as an indication that, for firms with greater growth opportunities, the 
opportunity costs of the CEO's holding outside directorships are larger.  It is worth noting 
that our Tobin's Q variable is different from their market-to-book variable and also that we 
measure reciprocal CEO interlocks and not just the number of outside directorships held by 
a CEO. 
     22 We did not, however, find a significant relationship between reciprocal CEO interlocks 
and the CEO's tenure as CEO.  The last result differs somewhat from that of Booth and Deli 
 22
 Third, the bank indicator variable is negative in both regressions and is significant in 
the step probit regression.23  The multivariate analysis thus supports the univariate 
conclusions: The CEOs of banks do seem to be more reluctant to participate in reciprocal 
interlocks than are their counterparts at other firms, either because of regulatory pressures or 
their fears of conflict-of-interest claims. 
 The remaining control variables did not yield significant coefficients.  Because a few 
of these variables did show significant results in the univariate differences in means, they are 
worthy of some discussion.  First, the size of the firm itself, as measured by total assets, did 
yield positive coefficients (consistent in direction with the univariate comparison), but 
neither was significant.24  Second, as noted above, the size of the board is insignificant, and 
the coefficients vary in sign in the two regressions.  By contrast, in the univariate analysis, 
the firms with reciprocally linked CEOs had significantly larger boards.  Third, and perhaps 
surprisingly, though the presence of other (outside) CEOs on a company's board does yield 
positive coefficients in both regressions (consistent in direction with the univariate 
comparison), those coefficients are not significant.25 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1996), who find a significant positive association between the number of outside 
directorships that a CEO holds and his tenure as CEO.  They interpret their result as support 
for Vancil's (1987) process of CEOs' transferring responsibilities to their successors as their 
tenure as CEO lengthens, which thereby reduces the cost to the company of the CEO's 
taking an outside directorship. 
     23 This negative effect is present even though the set of two-digit SIC dummy variables 
includes a separate variable for all financial institutions.  When the regressions are estimated 
without the inclusion of the industry dummy variables, the same results hold: the bank 
variable remains negative in both regressions and is significant in the step probit regression. 
   24 Other measures of firm size, such as the natural log of sales, were also tried, yielding 
similar absences of significant effects. 
     25 To check for robustness, a number of other explanatory variables -- such as the 
composition of the board, the age of the CEO, the annual return on assets of the company, 
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5.3 Further Controls 
 
5.3.1 Strategic Interactions 
 
 Relationships between firms may evolve in order to reduce contracting costs 
between two parties.  Firms may interlock corporate boards to improve or solidify their 
contracting relationships.  For instance, a firm may want to have a customer on their board 
and/or to place one of its executives on the customer’s board.  If the firm is very dependent 
on the particular contracting relation that it has with the other party, it may wish to have its 
CEO as a member on that other firm’s board.  In addition to the possible strategic advantage 
a firm may acquire by a board interlock, Booth and Deli (1996) argue that asymmetry of 
information is reduced for the buyer (supplier) when she is a member of the supplier’s 
(buyer’s) board. 
These assertions lead us to identify as an empirically testable question the use of 
interlocking relationships as a tool for enhancing the strategic objectives of firms. 
 
5.3.2 CEO’s Influence 
 The results presented in Table 4 support our hypothesis suggesting that the 
probability of reciprocal CEO interlock increases in firms where CEOs do not derive 
large fractions of their total compensation from stock options.  It is clear that if this is the 
case the CEOs will promote and work toward the formation of reciprocal interlocks.  One 
clear way that a CEO would have in helping promote reciprocal interlocks is by serving 
on the board’s nominating committee.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
etc. -- were tried in these regressions, with insignificant results and with no change in the 
main results reported above. 
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quality of director appointments diminishes when the CEO is involved in the appointment 
of the new directors.  In fact, they show that market reactions are significantly lower 
when the CEO is in the nominating committee and involved in the appointment than 
when the CEO is not. 
 In the context of our investigation we identify the relationship between a CEO’s 
serving on the board’s nominating committee and the presence of CEO interlocks as 
another open empirical question. 
 
5.3.3 Results 
 For 350 firms in our sample we are able to obtain information on its nominating 
committee.26  In this reduced sample there are 71 firms that have a reciprocal interlocking 
relationship between CEOs.  These interlocks are again used as the dependent variable in 
our analysis.    As an additional explanatory variable we use a (0,1) indicator to identify 
the absence or presence of the firm’s CEO in the committee. We use this indicator 
variable to test the effect, if any, that a CEO serving in the nominating committee may 
have on the formation of reciprocal interlocks.  
All firms in our reduced sample have at least one CEO as an outside director 
(though only 71 are involved in an interlocking relationship).  For all 350 firms we 
construct a (0,1) indicator variable to identify the outside CEOs that are gray directors 
(i.e., that may be from a supplier or customer firm).  The variable equals 0 if an outside 
CEO director is not gray, and is equal to 1 otherwise.  We define this variable as a 
                                                           
26  We wish to thank April Klein for graciously sharing her nominating committee data 
with us. 
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"strategic objectives" indicator and use it to test if firms use reciprocal interlocking 
relationships as a device to improve their strategic objectives. 
Table 5 presents the results of our estimation using the reduced sample of 350 
firms. We estimate a simple probit model since the maximum number of reciprocal CEO 
interlocks that any firm in this sample has is one. The first column in Table 5 repeats the 
analysis we performed in the first column of Table 4. The second column expands the 
analysis by including the (0,1) indicator variable for strategic objectives and the (0,1) 
indicator variable that identifies the absence or presence of the CEO on the board’s 
nominating committee. 
 The overall results presented in Table 5 are in agreement with our results in Table 
4.  Reciprocal CEO interlocks are less likely to be formed if CEOs receive large fractions 
of their total pay from stock options, less likely to occur in firms whose boards meet 
more frequently, less likely to arise in banks, and more likely to occur in highly reputable 
boards.  In the second column of Table 5 we address the two open empirical questions 
that are identified in this section.  We note that the CEO-on-the-nominating-committee 
(0,1) variable is positive and significant.  This result is consistent with the notion that a 
CEO’s intervention in the nominating process promotes the formation of reciprocal 
interlocks. 
 Our strategic objective (0,1) indicator variable is not significant.27  This result 
may indicate that the desire to have a supplier or a buyer on one's board does not 
                                                           
27  We also replaced the strategic objective (0,1) indicator variable by the number of 
outside gray CEOs divided by the total number of outside CEOs. This variable was also 
not significant. 
 26
necessarily promote or increase the likelihood of the formation of a reciprocal 
interlocking relationship between CEOs.28 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The board of directors of a public corporation represents a key mechanism for 
monitoring managers and making important financial decisions.  The composition of boards 
of directors is an important component of a system of corporate governance.  Increased 
knowledge about the determinants of that composition can further the understanding of 
corporate governance structures. 
 We start by noting that the reciprocal interlocks of CEOs on the boards of large 
corporations -- situations where the CEO of company i is on the board of company j and the 
CEO of company j is on the board of company i -- occur in a non-trivial number of 
instances: in 1991 about one large company in seven was involved in a reciprocal interlock 
of this type.  We are unaware of any previous efforts to explain this phenomenon.  We next 
offer some hypotheses as to the circumstances that may encourage or discourage such 
reciprocal interlocks.  We conjecture that reciprocal CEO interlocks are (a) more likely 
when a board has more outside directorships, (b) less likely when a CEO has more of his 
total annual compensation paid in the form of stock options, (c) less likely when a 
company's board is more active and holds more meetings, (d) less likely when a CEO has a 
larger ownership share of his company, and (e) more likely when there are more CEOs from 
other companies as outside directors on a CEO's board. 
                                                           
28 Our definition of "gray" includes not only those individuals that have commercial 
relationships with the firm, but also those directors who are relatives of the firm's 
officers.  It is possible that this errors-in-variables situation precludes us from measuring 
the full impact that business relationships among firms have in promoting reciprocal 
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 We test these hypotheses on a sample of 610 large corporations in 1991, using 
company, board, and CEO characteristics as control variables.  Using simple probit and step 
probit models, we find significant statistical support for the first three of our hypotheses but 
not the fourth and fifth (although our univariate analysis does provide support for the latter 
two).  We also find significant positive relationships between the probability of a reciprocal 
CEO interlock and the Tobin's Q of a company and the tenure of the CEO with the 
company, and we find an inverse and significant relationship in the step probit analysis 
between the probability of a reciprocal CEO interlock and whether the CEO's firm is a bank.  
Further, for a smaller (but consistent) sample we find that the presence of the CEO on the 
nominating committee is a significant positive influence on the likelihood of reciprocal 
interlocks, but we do not find that reciprocal interlocks are used to advance the strategic 
objectives of the firm. 
 By showing that reciprocal CEO interlocks are not random phenomena but have 
significant determinants, our results may help address some of the controversies surrounding 
interlocking directorates.  Advocates of such arrangements argue that the interlocks are 
beneficial, particularly if they promote less costly monitoring, help mobilize private 
information, or economize on scarce managerial resources.  In such instances, interlocking 
relationships can promote efficiency and increase shareholders' wealth.  In contrast, 
opponents of such arrangements see them as promoting cronyism, exacerbating agency 
problems, and potentially reducing competition in the market for corporate control, thereby 
reducing efficiency and stockholders' wealth.  Though our results do not settle this dispute, 
they do show its relevance, since we find that this powerful form of interlock -- the 
reciprocal CEO interlock -- is significant and purposive. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
interlocking relationships between their CEOs. 
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 Further, our results shed some direct and indirect light on the consequences of 
reciprocal CEO interlocks for shareholder wealth.  As noted above, we find a significant 
positive association between CEO reciprocal interlocks and the CEO’s involvement in the 
selection of directors; since Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find negative market reactions 
to director appointments when CEOs are involved in the selection of new directors, a likely 
negative market reaction to CEO reciprocal interlocks seems reasonable as well.  Further, 
we do not find that CEO reciprocal interlocks occur in a way that might advance the 
strategic objectives of the firm.  Also, the negative association between stock option 
compensation and CEO reciprocal interlocks may indicate that inadequate performance-
linked compensation may cause the CEO to divert some of his attention to the activities of 
another company, at the expense of his “home” company’s shareholders.  The positive 
association between the outside directorships of a company’s board and CEO reciprocal 
interlocks may indicate that a “classy” board membership is a magnet for other CEOs; but 
the prevalence of outside directorships may also mean that the company’s affairs do not 
receive adequate board attention, and this inefficient culture encourages the CEO similarly 
to divert his attention to other companies’ boards.  In addition, we find that banks are 
reluctant to become a party to CEO reciprocal interlocks, perhaps for the reasons suggested 
by Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  Finally, though we find a positive association between 
CEO reciprocal interlocks and Tobin’s Q, we cannot tell whether it is a company’s higher Q 
that attracts the reciprocal CEOs or whether their presence is a contributing factor to the 
higher Q. 
 Our research concerning reciprocal CEO interlocks has examined this phenomenon 
primarily from the perspective of a single company, and its board and CEO, that is a party to 
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such a relationship.  Although we do not find evidence consistent with the notion that such 
relationships might serve as a means of enhancing the strategic objectives of firms, future 
investigations could build on our results to explore this issue further.  We believe that such 
research, along with the results presented in this paper, can widen the understanding of this 
significant aspect of board composition and corporate governance. 
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Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
The sample consists of 610 annual observations for 1991.  A firm is included in the sample if Forbes Magazine ranked it as one of the 
500 U.S. largest public companies during the year on any of four criteria: total assets, market capitalization, sales, or net income.  A 
reciprocal CEO interlock occurs when the CEO of firm i serves as a director of firm j and the CEO of firm j serves as a director of 
firm i.  A reciprocal company interlock occurs when any current or retired employee from firm i (including the CEO) sits of firm's j's 
board and any current or retired employee from firm j (including the CEO) sits on firm's i's board.  Board size represents the number 
of board directors, as listed in the proxy statement as of the annual meeting date during the fiscal year.  Inside directors are those who 
are current of former officers of each firm.  Gray directors are those who are relatives of corporate officers, or those who have a 
substantial business relationship with the firm, either personally or through their principal employers.  Outside directors are those who 
have neither inside nor gray status.  Director fees include annual retainers and fees paid for regular and special board meetings during 
the fiscal year.  The number of board meetings per year reports meetings of the board of directors during the fiscal year, including 
regular and special meetings, but not telephone meetings or action by written consent.  The value of stock options granted consists of 
new stock options (including stock appreciation rights) granted during the year, adjusted for stock splits calculated using the Black-
Scholes (1973) formula.  The CEO-from-founding-family dummy variable equals 1 if is a member of the company’s founding family 
or if the CEO is a member of a family that acquired control of the firm.  Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the 
replacement value of the assets.  The bank (0,1) indicator is a variable that takes the value of one if the company is a bank and takes 
the value of zero otherwise.  Board reputation is measured by the number of outside directorships held by the company’s board 
members. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                    
 
Variable 
               
Mean 
 
Median 
    
Standard 
Deviation 
CEO Characteristics    
CEO's salary and bonus (in thousands of dollars) 1013 841 735.29696 
CEO's other compensation 297.82266 47 685.92309 
Value of the CEO’s options when granted (in    thousands 
of dollars) 
 
562.86676 
 
144.019 
 
1409 
Fraction of the CEO’s compensation coming from stock 
options 
0.21506 0.16140 0.23402 
Fractional ownership of the CEO in the firm (% of 
outstanding shares) 
 
0.02110 
 
0.0014 
 
0.06579 
Age of the CEO (years) 57.71967 58 6.55018 
CEO tenure as CEO (years) 8.61639 6 7.99777 
CEO tenure in the firm (years) 24.61311 27 12.37261 
CEO as founder: 1 if the CEO is a member of the founding 
family, 0 otherwise. 
 
0.12951 
 
0 
 
0.33604 
BOARD Characteristics    
Board size (number of directors) 13.05738 13 3.79417 
Number of inside directors 3.83115 3 2.09997 
Number of outside directors 7.97541 8 3.61047 
Number of gray directors 1.25082 1 1.45915 
Number of directors who are CEOs of other firms 2.16557 2 1.91797 
Number of board meetings during the fiscal year 8.32007 8 3.26189 
Board reputation (number of outside directorships) 10.58689 8 8.95949 
Number of reciprocal CEO interlocks 0.17213 0 0.46011 
Number of reciprocal company interlocks 0.34918 0 0.77589 
Director's retainer fee (in dollars) 20726 20000 9369 
COMPANY Characteristics    
Firm size (natural log of assets) 8.53614 8.42668 1.17247 
Return on assets 0.09769 0.088546 0.07866 
Tobin's Q 1.09983 0.98077 0.62408 
Bank (0,1) indicator 0.12951 0 0.33604 
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Table 2 
Incidence of Reciprocal CEO Interlocks 
 
           
CEO Interlock Frequency Percent 
 
0 
 
523 
 
85.74 
1 72 11.80 
2 12 1.97 
3 3 0.49 
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Table 3 
Means for the Sub-samples of Non CEO Interlocked and Reciprocal CEO Interlocked Firms 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The third column provides the absolute value of the difference between the two sub-
samples. Please refer to Table 1 for a full variable description. 
 
Variables 
 
 
N 
Means of the 
Sub-sample 
Without CEO 
Interlocks 
Means of the 
Sub-sample 
with CEO 
Interlocks 
Difference  
of Means 
(Absolute) 
CEO Characteristics     
CEO's salary and bonus (in thousands of dollars) 608 977.49 
(749.05) 
1232.3 
(604.32) 
254.8a 
CEO's other compensation 609 285.6 
(684.45) 
372.13 
(694.17) 
86.52 
Value of the CEO’s options when granted (in thousands 
of dollars) 
607 550.78 
(1478.9) 
636.36 
(874.14) 
85.58 
Fraction of the CEO’s compensation coming from stock 
options 
607 0.2087 
(0.2365) 
0.2535 
(0.2158) 
0.045 
Fractional ownership of the CEO in the firm (% of 
outstanding shares) 
610 0.0234 
(0.0696) 
0.0074 
(0.0325) 
0.016b 
Age of the CEO (years) 610 57.539 
(6.7393) 
58.805 
(5.1734) 
1.265c 
CEO tenure as CEO (years) 610 8.608 
(8.1817) 
8.6667 
(6.8296) 
0.059 
CEO tenure in the firm (years) 610 23.878 
(12.56) 
29.034 
(10.242) 
5.157a 
CEO as founder: 1 if the CEO is a member of the 
founding family, 0 otherwise. 
610 0.1434 
(0.3508) 
0.046 
(0.2106) 
0.0974a 
BOARD Characteristics     
Board size (number of directors) 610 12.87 
(3.8728) 
14.184 
(3.0672) 
1.314a 
Number of inside directors 610 3.8145 
(2.0609) 
3.931 
(2.3317) 
0.117 
Number of outside directors 610 7.7878 
(3.665) 
9.1034 
(3.0463) 
1.316a 
Number of gray directors 610 1.2677 
(1.4703) 
1.1494 
(1.3937) 
0.1183 
Number of directors who are CEOs of other firms 610 1.9943 
(1.88) 
3.1954 
(1.829) 
1.201a 
Number of board meetings during the fiscal year 603 8.3488 
(3.3505) 
8.1494 
(2.6873) 
0.1994 
Board reputation (number of outside directorships) 610 9.0593 
(8.0769) 
19.77 
(8.5422) 
10.71a 
Number of company interlocks 610 0.1358 
(0.4138) 
1.6322 
(1.1321) 
1.496a 
Director's retainer fee (in dollars) 604 19733 
(9061.3) 
26692 
(9013.4) 
6958a 
COMPANY Characteristics     
Firm size (natural log of assets) 610 8.4418 
(1.133) 
9.1034 
(1.2504) 
0.662a 
Return on assets 608 0.0956 
(0.0787) 
0.1076 
(0.0783) 
0.012 
Tobin's Q 610 1.0879 
(0.6106) 
1.1716 
(0.6992) 
0.084 
Bank (0,1) indicator 610 0.1453 
(0.6106) 
0.0345 
(0.1835) 
0.1108a 
a: significant at the 1% level; b: significant at the 5% level; c: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4  
Simple Probit and Step Probit Coefficient Estimates: Reciprocal CEO Interlocks 
Coefficient estimates for simple probit and step probit models for reciprocal CEO interlocks.  The dependent variable in the first 
column is a 0,1 indicator for the presence of at least one reciprocal CEO interlock.   A reciprocal CEO interlock occurs when the CEO 
of firm i serves as a director of firm j and the CEO of firm j serves as a director of firm i. The dependent variable in the second column 
represents the actual number of reciprocal CEO interlocks.  Both models include industry 0,1 dummy variables.  Standard errors 
appear in parentheses below each estimate.  Please refer to Table 1 for a full variable description. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable Simple Probit 
Estimates 
Step Probit 
Estimates 
Intercept -7.21255b 
(3.15097) 
-6.276977b 
(2.88393) 
Natural log of the CEO's salary and bonus -0.27055 
(0.17180) 
-0.24324 
(0.16202) 
Fraction of the CEO's total pay coming from stock options -0.78039b 
(0.42423) 
-0.92461b 
(0.40328) 
Fractional ownership of the CEO in the firm (% of outstanding 
shares) 
-1.20027 
(1.15003) 
-1.47192 
(1.11179) 
CEO's age 0.02686 
(0.01832) 
0.02246 
(0.01724) 
Tenure of the CEO as CEO 0.0023589 
(0.01403) 
0.0019446 
(0.01315) 
Tenure of the CEO with the firm 0.01405c 
(0.00842) 
0.01349c 
(0.0079523) 
CEO as founder (0,1) -0.53074 
(0.39509) 
-0.44248 
(0.36900) 
Natural logarithm of board size  -0.0062376 
(0.42006) 
0.02491 
(0.40057) 
Number of directors who are CEOs of other firms 0.07204 
(0.04897) 
0.05174 
(0.04647) 
Number of board meetings -0.07346b 
(0.03303) 
-0.05449b 
(0.03094) 
Board reputation (total number of outside directorships) 0.05959a 
(0.01310) 
0.05335a 
(0.01215) 
Natural log of directors' fees 0.48307 
(0.30469) 
0.36416 
(0.27827) 
Firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) 0.10679 
(0.11902) 
0.14642 
(0.11329) 
Tobin’s Q (market value of assets divided by the replacement 
value of assets) 
0.32566c 
(0.17151) 
0.28013c 
(0.16035) 
Bank (0,1) indicator -0.53771 
(0.36906) 
-0.62684c 
(0.35986) 
 
a: significant at the 1% level; b: significant at the 5% level; c: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5  
Probit Coefficient Estimates: Reciprocal CEO Interlock  
Coefficient estimates for probit models for CEO interlock. The dependent variable in both columns is a (0,1) indicator for CEO 
interlock. Both estimations include industry (0,1) dummies. Standard errors appear in parentheses below each estimate. Please refer to 
Table 1 and Section 5 for a full variable description. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable Control 
Model 
Expanded 
Model 
Intercept -10.65051a 
(4.11945) 
-8.88757b 
(4.26295) 
Natural log of the CEO's salary and bonus -0.25043 
(0.20387) 
-0.27456 
(0.21175) 
Fraction of the CEO's total pay coming from stock options -1.00480b 
(0.40034) 
-0.86465b 
(0.41584) 
Fractional ownership of directors and officers in the firm (% of outstanding 
shares) 
-0.71865 
(1.66181) 
-0.90591 
(1.77586) 
CEO's age 0.02690 
(0.02228) 
0.02425 
(0.02296) 
Tenure of the CEO as CEO 0.0023589 
(0.01403) 
0.01761 
(0.01879) 
Tenure of the CEO with the firm 0.01898c 
(0.01064) 
0.02057c 
(0.01161) 
CEO as founder (0,1) -0.29950 
(0.46969) 
-0.27522 
(0.48404) 
Natural logarithm of board size  -0.12137 
(0.57742) 
0.03875 
(0.61053) 
Number of directors who are CEOs of other firms 0.05421 
(0.06059) 
0.05125 
(0.06383) 
Number of board meetings -0.08126b 
(0.04177) 
-0.08123b 
(0.04044) 
Board reputation (total number of outside directorships) 0.05796a 
(0.01559) 
0.06807a 
(0.01649) 
Natural log of directors' fees 0.68913 
(0.47844) 
0.66477 
(0.48930) 
Firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) 0.13175 
(0.15807) 
0.14368 
(0.16535) 
Tobin’s Q (market value of assets over replacement value of assets) 0.33578b 
(0.17703) 
0.33565b 
(0.17711) 
Bank (0,1) indicator -1.40265c 
(0.78444) 
-1.25772c 
(0.76420) 
Strategic objectives (0,1) indicator 
 
 0.03486 
(0.26820) 
CEO in the nominating committee (0,1) indicator  2.25539a 
  (0.69746) 
 
 
a: significant at the 1 % level; b: significant at the 5% level; c: significant at the 10% level. 
